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Why did the legal principle of sovereign equality of states need a restatement in 
1970? After all, it was not only expressly declared in the UN Charter (“The Or-
ganization is based on the sovereign equality of its members”, Article 2(1)) but 
also deeply embedded in the conceptual structure of international law. One could 
say (and some have said) that the restatement was simply a redundancy.1 To be a 
“State” was to possess sovereignty, and “sovereignty” meant that one was not 
subordinated to another entity. All sovereigns would thus be equal in their non-
subordination to each other. But whatever purists might say, the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration was intended by its initiators neither as an exercise around the 
meaning or logic of the key concepts of the Charter nor as a formal celebration of 
their 25-year old existence. It was instead part of the push by the decolonised 
world, the majority of the UN members that had not participated in the drafting of 
the Charter, to give its major provisions a meaning that would better include their 
objectives.2 
The debate on the Friendly Relations Declaration in the various Special 
Committees during 1963–1970 provides a good example of how international 
legal concepts are used as “fighting words” in order to advance or oppose specific 
policies. Who could possibly have anything against “Friendly Relations and Co-
operation”?  Is it not obvious that this is what all members of the United Nations – 
                                               
 
1  For Arangio Ruiz, sovereign equality is “too tautological for words”. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The UN 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of Sources of International Law (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1979), 144.  
2  There is a tendency in academic literature to diminish the programmatic aspect of the 1970 declaration 
and to take the principle of “sovereign equality”, as Brad Roth puts it, “no[t] as a political slogan, but as a 
reference to a core set of legal entitlements that the legal order attributes equally to all states”. Sovereign 
Equality and Moral Disagreement (Oxford University Press 2011), 53. As such, it appears as a merely 
analytical devise – which, while perhaps useful from a moral-jurisprudential perspective – fails to capture 
its role in the late-20th century debates over the character of the international order.  
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indeed all human beings – crave? And yet, some Western lawyers were dubious of 
the project from the start. In a long review of its preparatory work until 1966, 
George Haight from the US, for example, regarded the title as a “euphemism for 
‘peaceful coexistence’ and an old stalking horse in the Cold War”, created to 
“meet the propaganda challenge of the Soviet block”. A “major objective”, he 
wrote, was to “foment wars of liberation in order to assist allegedly ‘enslaved 
peoples’ in the struggles against allegedly ‘imperialist oppressors’”. 3  We may 
(indeed we should) disagree with the tone of Haight’s point, but not really with 
his perspective.  
The project for a declaration was not just to spell out truisms that would leave 
the UN and the world as it was. True, that is how many Western representatives 
saw it during the preparatory process, when they were keen to stress that the dec-
laration would, above all, deal with the “juridical equality of States” and “respect” 
for their “personality”. 4  But for the representatives of the formerly colonized 
countries – supported by the socialist block – it was instead part of the collective 
effort that had commenced by the passing of the Decolonization Declaration 
(UNGA Res 1514 (1960)) and would peak in the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (UNGA Res 3281 (1974)). With all these instruments, the Third 
World countries, or the Group of 77, aimed at tweaking the Charter and the activi-
ties of the organization towards their political objectives, especially the push to-
wards more than the merely formal equality that UN membership offered to 
them.5 In the drafting process, this was most clearly visible in the failed effort by 
the representatives from developing States to include a reference to what was la-
belled “[t]he right of States to dispose freely of their national wealth and natural 
resources”. For these representatives, a declaration of “sovereign equality” in 
1970 would need to draw attention to the world’s immense political, military and 
above all economic inequalities. Failing to go beyond “juridical equality” would 
                                               
 
3  George Haight, ‘Principles of International law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States’, 1 The International Lawyer (1966), 96–7.  
4  See e.g. the proposal by the United Kingdom, UN Doc. A/AC.119/L.8, included in Report of the Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States, UNGA Doc A/5746 (16 November 1964), 149 (para 296). The proposal listed four elements in the 
principles: (a) that States are juridically equal; (b) that each State enjoys the rights inherent in its sover-
eignty; (c) that the personality of the State is respected, as well as its territorial integrity and political in-
dependence; (d) that the State should, under international order, comply faithfully with its duties and ob-
ligations”.  
5  This objective was well expressed in the emblematic work of a late phase in that era, Mohammed Be-
djaoui’s Towards a New International Economic Order (UNESCO 1979). “Sovereign equality”, he wrote 
there , was to be “formulated afresh so as to restore to each State the basic elements of its national inde-
pendence on the economic level”, 87. In the “vast and prodigious battle against inequality”, UN General 
Assembly resolutions would be the favoured instruments of the Third World, 13 and 138-143.  
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underline the hypocrisy of an institution that tolerated and, as history would show, 
helped to produce the massively unequal distribution of power and resources be-
tween what we have now learned to call the global south and the developed north. 
“Sovereign equality” was a fighting expression, not a logical redundancy. Every-
one understood that it was to be read as a call for transformation.   
We now know that nothing came of that effort. According to the most recent 
Oxfam report, “eighty two percent of the wealth generated [in 2018] went to the 
richest one percent of the global population, while the 3.7 billion people who 
make up the poorest half of the world saw no increase in their wealth”.6 Such data 
could, of course, be produced endlessly. It has become part of the background 
noise that merges with the flow of global information which, instead of inciting to 
action, contributes to the melancholic consciousness around the world that acqui-
esces to the inevitability of what exists. What a difference half a century makes! 
In 1970 the UN had begun a number of reform projects to attack the injustices of 
the old world – from control of multinational companies to the sharing of space 
technology, from the distribution of marine resources to supporting national liber-
ation movements. It was the point of the Declaration to bring such and many other 
projects under a single restatement that would show the UN as not just a post-war 
institution set up to perpetuate the control of the victorious powers but as a mech-
anism for building a fairer world. Of course, the general and question-begging 
nature of many of its provisions shows the complexity of that task and how little 
agreement there was on where it should begin or what it might mean. “Sovereign 
equality” concentrates all the ambivalences of that very effort. Its pure formalism 
tells us not to discriminate between the “just” and the “unjust”; and for those im-
patient with such formalism it puts the impossible burden of having to convert 
everyone else (including the unjust) to a faith that is at its weakest precisely when 
it has to explain itself.  
Sovereign equality is both necessary and impossible. In the absence of a uni-
versal moral truth – or at least access to anything of the kind – it invites us to live 
with the special truths of different nations, as if saying: there is no world empire, 
so let’s accept the world we have and try to make the best of it. Sovereign equality 
invites pluralism, tolerance and an effort to work in good faith and on fair terms 
with those with whom we disagree. But behind its façade of common-sense and 
practical advice, it holds the wish for transformation in abeyance. The tension 
                                               
 
6  ‘Richest 1 percent bagged 82 percent of wealth created last year – poorest half of humanity got nothing’ 
Oxfam Press Release, 22 January 2018, https://www.oxfam.org 
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between merely “formal” and truly “substantive” equality keeps pressing legal 
actors to move from words to deeds, their hypocrisy reminding them over again of 
the virtue to which they pay endless compliment.  
The inequality of sovereign nations is so ingrained in the fabric of the interna-
tional system that a single chapter may hardly hope to properly unpack the rea-
sons and stakes behind it. But one thing we can try is to stand back and behold the 
sheer immensity of the challenge that sovereign equality has always posed inter-
national lawyers. Accordingly, in the following we will walk alongside the disci-
pline’s long-term past and take stock of some of the attempts of our predecessors 
to deal (or avoid dealing) with this most controversial equation. 
II. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY: AN IDEA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
The European world of sovereign states with a law of nations between them was 
born out of the demise of the pretence of the Holy Roman Emperor of being a 
dominus mundi, Lord of the world. The monarchs of France, England and Spain 
had been claiming independence from the emperor and used the expression of 
“sovereign” to distinguish their kingship from that of other feudal lords at least 
since the 13th century. Even as ruling families in Europe and elsewhere often as-
serted their special status by invoking divine institution or their role as protectors 
of the faith, by the 18th century it was largely accepted that one could think of 
Europe as a “system” composed of several nations or “States” that were in some 
respect equal to each other. This moved the focus away from the person of the 
ruler or the de facto power of the structure that was the object of rule – that is 
“statehood” – and onto the recognition that, as a “State”, it was to be legally treat-
ed as equal to every other such (European) entity.  
But qualitative distinctions between sovereigns had been already useful for 
the Roman empire and careful distinctions were made in medieval times between 
the empire and barbarians, or the Christendom and the infidels. Long after the 
reformation and the peace of Westphalia had introduced a new European family 
of sovereign states, the distinction between those sovereigns and all the rest re-
mained central to the law of nations. Variations of this distinction would continue 
to be deployed to mark a rejection of non-European peoples as well as colonial 
insurgents, maroons and fugitive slaves beyond the pale of international law. 
Whatever the treaty-makers in Münster and Osnabruck may have believed 
they were doing, mid-eighteenth century jurists came to agree that “Westphalia” 
marked the end of any legitimate pursuit of formal Europe-wide hegemony. The 
Peace of Utrecht (1713), which ended the War of Spanish succession and what 
contemporaries saw as the French pursuit of “universal monarchy”, affirmed this 
   
 
 
 5  
 
 
interpretation by consecrating the technique of a balance of power at the heart of 
European diplomacy. It also served as the paradigm and the principal reference for 
the most important 18th century work on European diplomacy and the law of na-
tions, Emer de Vattel ’s Droit des gens (1758).  According to Vattel, “Europe 
forms a political system, an integral body, closely connected by the relations and 
different interests of the nations inhabiting this part of the world”.7 Two “general 
laws” formed the core of that “system”.  One was the  duty of every nation, as 
Vattel put it, “to contribute everything in her power to the happiness and perfec-
tion of all the others”, and the second was the perfect “liberty and independence” 
of each such nation, their ability to freely determine what they shall or shall not do 
in the pursuit of the “natural rights” that each enjoyed.8 “Liberty and independ-
ence” meant that no other nation could compel another to act in particular ways; 
each was entitled to follow its own lights. Vattel strengthened that point by a do-
mestic analogy: nations were “composed of men” and could therefore be “consid-
ered as so many free persons” who were “naturally equal, and inherit from nature 
the same obligations and rights”.9 True, diplomatic mores recognised all kinds of 
formal precedence and pre-eminence among the representatives of nations, but 
none of this deviated from the legal equality of their nations.10 Vattel concluded 
with these famous lines: “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is 
no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom”.11   
The idea of “sovereign equality” was the product of enlightenment rational-
ism: if an entity was internally free and externally independent, then it was logi-
cally equal to every other such entity. The account was also limited in the same 
ways as enlightenment rationalism was. In the first place, it remained confined to 
the European world. Few 18th century lawyers had much to say about the world 
outside. The commonplace lament about Spanish behaviour in the “Indies” did not 
translate into arguments about equality. Vattel, for instance, mentioned China, 
Japan, Ceylon and the Ottoman empire in several places, recognizing the binding 
nature of the legal arrangements made with them. But he also labelled the Otto-
mans as a “savage nation” that could be seen as an “enemy to the human race” 
                                               
 
7  Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (ed. and intro. by B Kapossy & R Whatmore, Indianapolis 2008 
[1758]), III. 3.47 (496).  
8  Vattel, Preliminaries, 13-16 (73-74).  
9  Vattel, Preliminaries, 18 (75).  
10  Vattel, II 3.36-40 (281-4).  
11  Vattel, Preliminaries, 18 (75). 
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that could be subjected to punishment or even “extermination”.12  Although he put 
forward no general distinction between “civilized” and “uncivilized” nations, he 
did use “civilization” itself as a criterion for discriminatory treatment (including 
within Europe).  
The second limitation of rationalism was, well – that it was rationalism. Per-
haps the most important effort in the 18th century to make diplomatic reality of 
sovereign equality was the proposal of 21 articles, made by one of the great survi-
vors of the French revolutionary period, the abbé Henri Grégoire in the National 
Convention in the spring of 1793. According to the proposed Déclaration de 
droits des gens (Declaration on the Rights of Nations), all peoples (gens) were 
“independent and sovereign” and connected to each other by “universal morality”. 
Each people was master of its territory while areas not subject to occupation (such 
as the seas) belonged to all. Foreigners were to abide by the laws of the country 
where they stayed, and a people had the right to refuse entry to foreigners it con-
sidered dangerous to their security. Any attack against the liberty of one people 
was an attack on all of them and offensive leagues were contrary to the “human 
family”. There were to be no ranks among the representatives of peoples, and they 
enjoyed immunity from the laws of their receiving countries. Finally, even as 
Grégoire expressed the view that that “no other government [was] in conformity 
with the rights of peoples than ones that [were] based on equality and liberty”, he 
also accepted that no people had the right to intervene in the government of an-
other.13  
The declaration was never adopted. In view of the tense international situa-
tion in June 1793, the deputies held it sufficient to state that France declare its 
friendship with all peoples; there was reason to be “political” and not to express 
futile philanthropic sentiments. The same fate befell Grégoire’s second try two 
years later. Already at the time, German lawyers ridiculed Grégoire’s idealism. Its 
submission gave reason for Georg-Friedrich von Martens at the University of Göt-
                                               
 
12  Vattel, III 3.34 (487). For details, see Jennifer Pitts, ‘Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth 
Century, 117 The American Historical Review (2012), 92–121.  
13  For the articles, see Pierre Fauchon, L’abbé Grégoire. Le prêtre-citoyen (Paris, Nouvelle-République, 
1989), 87-88. For a critical commentary highlighting the “chimerical” aspects of the articles, see Linda 
Frey & Marsha Frey, ‘Grégoire and the Breath of Reason: The French Revolutionaries and the Droit des 
gens’. 38 Journal for the Western Society of French History (2010), 163-177. The best discussion of the 
context and a full list of the 21 articles can be found in Marc Bélissa, ‘La déclaration du droit des gens de 
l’abbé Grégoire (june 1973, 4 floréal an III)’, <https://revolution-francaise.net/2010/10/06/399-
declaration-droit-des-gens-abbe-gregoire-juin-1793>The text has also been reprinted in Vladimir-Djuro 
Degan, ‘L'affirmation des principes du Droit naturel par la Révolution française. Le projet de Déclaration 
du Droit des Gens de l'abbé Grégoire’. 35 Annuaire français de droit international (1989), 99-116.  
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tingen to write a new foreword to his widely read Einleitung in das positive eu-
ropäische Völkerrecht (later repeated in the 1820 and 1864 French editions as a 
kind of methodological-political credo of its author). There was no lack of aspects 
of international law, Martens wrote, where agreement between European powers 
would not be desirable. But to believe that they would suddenly adopt a general 
code of this type was devoid of any realism. Moreover, to declare principles of 
morality was pointless: they can be realised only under conditions which, if they 
were present, would make their declaration unnecessary.14 The declaration con-
sisted of principles that were self-evident, but empty as practical directives. Some 
of them were undoubtedly part of “pure natural law” – such as the equality of 
State representatives – that, however, would never be actually adopted. The repre-
sentative of San Marino would never be equal to the Ambassador of France. 
Nineteenth-century diplomacy, the system of Concert of Europe, followed 
Martens rather than Grégoire. The great powers took upon themselves leadership 
of European affairs and would eventually carry out their colonial projects without 
the item of sovereign equality being seriously raised from any quarter. The Con-
cert of Europe was thoroughly built upon an assumption that the old States were 
more legitimate than newcomers. Its hard core, Metternich’s Holly Alliance, was 
to be remembered as a bastion of Christian monarchism against the rise of consti-
tutionalism and all sorts of “real cosmopolitans, securing their personal advantage 
at the expense of any order of things whatever – paid State officials, men of let-
ters, lawyers, and the individuals charged with the public education”.15 Later on in 
the century, it was the turn of the Germans to demand sovereign equality against 
France. In the same correspondence that motivated Johann Caspar Bluntschli and 
other European international jurists to establish the Institut de droit international, 
Francis Lieber defended German unification and Wilhelm’s empire by insisting 
that France should “give up her absurd and pretended leadership of civilization” 
and stop interfering with the German constitution.16 The matter would not be 
solved until after the Franco-Prussian war and the fall of the French Empire, when 
                                               
 
14  Georg-Friedrich Martens, Einleitung in das positive europäische Völkerrecht (1796), viii-ix.  
15  See Metternich’s political confession of faith in Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1815–1829, Volume III 
(Mrs. Alexander Napier trans., London: Bentley & Son, 1881), No 488, at pp. 454–476. 
16  Thomas S. Perry ed., Life and Letters of Francis Lieber (Boston: James R. Osgood and Co, 1882), 365, 
373. 
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also the Institut was founded to seek and to develop a more civilized and liberal 
law of nations.17 
Beyond Europe, on the other hand, the nineteenth-century maritime powers 
operated through the pragmatic lens of colonialism and inter-imperial relations, 
with their reactions ranging from intervention in the Greek rebellion to a persis-
tent non-recognition of Haiti and from an overall neutrality in Spanish American 
revolutions to their ruthless gunboat diplomacy in the Far East. The 1884-85 Ber-
lin Africa Conference underlined the distinction, joining the great legal minds of 
Europe in a multilateral treaty-making enterprise nevertheless engaged directly in 
the partitioning and colonial exploitation of Africa. 
III. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AS A PROCESS 1869–1919  
The Institut de droit international was established to act as ‘the legal conscience 
of the civilized world’. In one of its very first studies, it asked whether the cus-
tomary European law of nations could also apply to Oriental nations.18 The issue 
had been in the air since 1856 when the Ottoman empire had been declared “wel-
come to participate in the advantages of the public law and the concert of Eu-
rope”.19 But the relationship between European powers and the Porte had hardly 
become one of sovereign equals; even the old Ottoman capitulations were not 
voided until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and arguably the Turkish position 
remained peripheral for a long time afterwards, regardless of their vindication in 
the case of the S.S. Lotus.20 The Institut’s study on the oriental question was 
framed in a keynote speech by Dudley Field, who thought that the separation be-
tween Christians and the Orientals was originally caused by the seclusive attitudes 
of the latter.21  Field proposed that non-Christian nations should be admitted to all 
the rights and subjected to all the duties of the nations of the West under interna-
                                               
 
17  On this confrontation, see Ville Kari, ‘A Less Elevated Cosmopolitanism: Victor Hugo, Francis Lieber, 
and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870’ in Jan Klabbers, Maria Varaki and Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça 
eds., Towards Responsible Global Governance (University of Helsinki 2018), 31–52. 
18  1 IDI Annuaire 7–10. The topic was thus on par with the treatment of private property in maritime wars, 
the establishment of an international prize court, the development of the laws and customs of war, and the 
conflict of laws. 
19  General peace treaty of Paris (30 March 1856), 114 CTS 409, 46 BFSP 8, Art VII. 
20  Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne (24 July 1923) 28 LNTS (1924) No 701, Article 28; S.S. Lotus (7 
September 1927) PCIJ Rep. Series A.–No.10, 4. On the capitulations, see Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo 
international law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 79–85. See further Eliana Augusti, Questioni 
D’Oriente. Europa e imperio Ottomano nel diritto internazionale dell’Ottocento (Edizioni Scientifichi, 
2013).  
21  A.P. Sprague ed., Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1884) 447–456, at 450–451.  
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tional law – with the single exception that “until there is a greater assimilation 
between the nations of the East and the West with respect to judicial institutions, 
mixed courts and a special procedure should be established for the decision of all 
cases, public or private, in which Americans and Europeans are parties”.22 
The commission produced its report in 1879.23 The results were inconclusive. 
Although there did not seem to be fundamental obstacles to a gradual rapproche-
ment of the European and Oriental civilizations – the latter for example also ac-
cepted that nations could only be bound by obligations to which they had consent-
ed – considerable difficulties lay in the practical implementation of any sovereign 
equality. In particular, “all the European experts” were of the opinion “that the 
moment had not yet arrived when the European nations could dispose of the pro-
tective guarantees on which the administration of justice are safeguarded by virtue 
of the capitulations”.24 In the end, the commission found the question was too 
general and recommended in to be studied one Oriental power at a time.  
In one respect, however, the study group did point a way forward. It restated 
and retrenched Europe’s ancient “civilizing mission”. Citing notorious incidents 
such as the Opium War, professor Joseph Hornung scolded the Christian powers 
for treating the question of the Orient simply as a narrow matter of protecting their 
own interests. But instead of suggesting that the Orient be treated as equals, Hor-
nung demanded that Europe step up its civilizing efforts in the “intelligent and 
disinterested tutelage of the feeble”. Europe was to intervene in violations of “the 
laws of humanity” and to safeguard “the grand interests of humanity”. The stakes 
were the highest possible: “The Völkerstaat dreamt by Kant cannot begin to mate-
rialize until the civilized humanity comprehends the grander morality of its mis-
sion and begins to see other things besides its own self-interest or that of its na-
tionals or its co-believers.”25 The view that colonialism was not just a deeply en-
trenched economic and political reality, but that it was something which in fact 
the Orient needed and to which Europe was obliged under international law, 
helped the European jurists circumvent many uncomfortable questions about the 
ethics of their world order. But they made sure to back this view up with the in-
creasing practice of written treaties between the colonizers and the natives, thus 
securing the (putative) consent of the indigenous populations to European domi-
                                               
 
22  Ibid, p. 456. 
23  3–4 IDI Annuaire (1879–1880), pp. 301–305. 
24  Ibid, p. 304. 
25  Note de M. Hornung, 3–4 IDI Annuaire (1879–1880) pp. 305–307. 
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nation.26 Such views were not eccentric but very much the norm in European in-
ternational legal scholarship. The civilizing mission was then very much in vogue 
during the 1884–5 Berlin Conference.27  
At the same time, plenty of inequality remained wrought within the internal 
fabric of the “civilized” world as well. As the intensifying transatlantic economy 
operated mainly between formally equal and fully recognized sovereigns, new 
international rules and principles emerged to govern then protection of foreign 
property and interests in sovereign states. State responsibility in particular became 
something of “a rite of passage for new States” regardless of the efforts of Latin 
American jurists such as Carlos Calvo to set its standards in terms favourable to 
their countries.28 The League of Nations would become one of the arenas for Latin 
American resistance to this practice. 29  But retrospective critics such as Carl 
Schmitt saw in this nothing less than a transmutation of the civilized / non-
civilized distinction into a new hierarchy between creditor and debtor States.30   
IV. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
The Paris Conference of 1919 began a thorough renovation of international rela-
tions. From the ashes of war rose not only the League of Nations, but also a much 
revised and redrawn map of the empires, States and dependencies of the world. 
The mandates system sought to define the boundary between sovereign and non-
sovereign peoples, and through it, the hierarchy was openly written down into an 
international constitution of the civilized world. The League exposed also other 
deep-rooted shortcomings in terms of sovereign equality. Membership itself was 
restricted, and some aspects of the organization – council membership, for in-
                                               
 
26  Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International law 1870-1960 
(CUP 2001), 136–143. 
27  For a notorious example see James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural 
Relations of Separate Political Communities (2 vols., William Blackwood and Sons 1883–4), Vol I p. 93, 
101–102, 156–162. See further Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy and International law: Lorimer’s 
Legal Science’. 27 EJIL (2016), 415-429. Around the same time, Hornung had developed his initial thesis 
into a series of articles on the distinction of the civilized and barbarians, and his views were much in tune 
with Lorimer’s. See Joseph Hornung, ‘Civilisés et barbares’ (Parts I–V), 17 RDI (1885) 1–18, 447–470, 
539–560 ; 18 RDI (1886) 188–206, 281–298. 
28  The expression is from Tzvika Alan Nissel, A History of State Responsibility: The Struggle for Interna-
tional Standards 1870–1960 (Doctoral thesis, Helsinki 2016), p. 192. See also 154–160 and 191–195. 
29  Kathryn Greenman, The History and Legacy of State Responsibility for Rebels 1839–1930 (Doctoral 
thesis, Amsterdam 2019) pp. 189–206; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo international law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014) p. 317–326. 
30  Carl Schmitt, ‘Forms of modern imperialism in international law’ (Matthew Hannah trans.) in Stephen 
Legg ed., Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos (Routledge 2011) 29–45, 
esp. 30–31. 
   
 
 
 11  
 
 
stance – placed nations within the organization in variable positions of power. 
Most famously, the drafting of the Covenant saw an express legal debate about – 
and a rejection of – the principle of racial equality among nations. As a conse-
quence, it can hardly be said that sovereign equality was ever at the core of the 
League of Nations project. Rather, the League project included a restatement of 
the prevailing sovereign inequalities under its formal international framework.31 
1. Members and Mandates 
The League of Nations was not open to all. There would always be sovereign 
States in the world that were either not interested in, or not admitted to, the 
League. Delegates were sent to Paris by many hopeful nations and peoples in-
spired by Wilson’s call for the self-determination of peoples, seeking to secure 
support or even recognition and statehood. These were not fringe groups but 
among them were ancient and often populous peoples such as Egyptians, Indians, 
Koreans, and different African peoples supported by pan-Africanists. Some new 
nations managed to get themselves recognized and elevated among the civilized 
peoples, while others would be disappointed.32 Many peoples had to simply ac-
quiesce to the continuation of colonialism.  
The mandates system emerged as a sort of compromise between British and 
French plans to simply keep the Ottoman territories and German colonies as old-
fashioned conquests, and Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of national self-determination 
which desired to open these areas for the open intercourse of all free nations.33 
Because the colonial peoples were “not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
                                               
 
31  Rose Parfitt, ‘Empire des Nègres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the Abyssinia 
Crisis of 1935–36’ 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) 849, 850–851. 
32  Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p. 227–230, 237–
239, 247, 270–274; Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: 
Random House 2001), p 225–242. On the significance of the ‘Wilsonian moment’ in the colonized world, 
see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolo-
nial Nationalism (Oxford University Press 2007). 
33  Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford University 
Press 2015), 17–35; Taina Tuori, From League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization: A History of the 
Language of Rights in International Law (Doctoral thesis, Helsinki 2016), 31–36. See also the Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916, 221 CTS 323. Even the American negotiators were not confident about the ap-
propriateness of granting full independence to nations that were in their eyes likewise only partially civi-
lized or even uncivilized. Their own experts in colonial affairs felt that the British model of colonial ad-
ministration was nevertheless the best model to manage and develop the underprivileged populations. The 
mandates compromise was finally proposed South African general Jan Smuts, an ardent pioneer of apart-
heidism. On the role of Smuts, see Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations p. 69; MacMillan Paris 
1919, 88–90, 98–100. The Smuts plan is also discussed in David Hunter Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, 
Volume I (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 34–39. 
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that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civili-
sation”, stated the League Covenant. Accordingly, the best method of giving prac-
tical effect to this principle was entrusting the “tutelage” of such peoples to “ad-
vanced nations” on behalf of the League”.34 In other words, the white man’s bur-
den was translated to the language of universal civilization. However, by the time 
the actual mandates system kicked off, the U.S. had had a change of heart and 
rejected its membership in the League. The key non-European component of the 
equation thus removed, the reality of the colonial administration in many of the 
mandated territories differed little from that of the remaining “proper” colonies. 
As Susan Pedersen observes, “[n]ot administration but rather the work of legiti-
mation moved to Geneva.”35 This is not to say that the mandates system was en-
tirely irrelevant; it forced the colonizers to constantly explain themselves and cre-
ated the prototypal body of international civil servants tasked with such oversight 
as it was able to exercise, but it certainly failed to satisfy the colonized peoples 
who were supposed to most benefit from the arrangement.  
2. Racial equality between nations 
Among the victorious powers, sovereign equality was not a fait accompli either. 
The most famous encounter in this respect involved the demand of Japan – now a 
major power – to include in the Covenant an express provision rejecting racial 
discrimination. Japan had come to Paris in part to rid itself of the residues of its 
second-class citizenship in the family of nations, and it intended to place this as a 
condition for its membership in the League.36 Its delegate Makino Nobuaki there-
fore presented an amendment that sought to expand the Covenant’s draft clause on 
‘religious liberty’ to encompass also racial equality: 
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting 
Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League 
equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account 
of their race or nationality.37 
Although the Japanese themselves had intended the proposal to be understood as 
juridical equality between the signatory States and the rights of their nationals, 
                                               
 
34  League of Nations Covenant, Article 22. 
35  Pedersen, The Guardians,  p. 5. 
36  Japan’s three objectives were the Pacific islands, Shandong, and the racial equality clause. Thomas W. 
Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938 (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i press 2008), 60. 
37  David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol I, p. 183; Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919 pp. 
317–318. 
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their audience saw in it a proposal for a broader racial equality in the world. It was 
received with both interest and scepticism by the Western powers, but above all it 
was seen as problematic. In back room negotiations, the Americans sought to 
ameliorate the proposal by rephrasing it to reflect their own constitutional maxim 
that “all men are created equal”, to which the British foreign secretary Lord Bal-
four allegedly responded that “that was an eighteenth century proposition which 
he did not believe was true”.38 On a more practical level, the proposal could not 
be accepted by countries such as Australia and the United States that were very 
concretely restricting the movement and property rights of Japanese immigrants.39 
In a telling note, the American drafter David Hunter Miller advised Wilson’s ad-
visor: 
The trouble with the Japanese proposition is this: … This draft was not acceptable because it had, 
as you appreciated, no particular legal effect, because it was not intended to have any. Any draft 
which had a real effect would, of course, be impossible.40 
In the final meeting on the Covenant, the Japanese delegates proposed a watered-
down compromise of the equality clause, one demoted to the Preamble and mere-
ly calling for “the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just 
treatment of their nationals”.41 They spoke eloquently and gradually gained sup-
port from all quarters, but got in the absence of unanimity ultimately rejected. 42 
 
The League of Nations was never established on the basis of sovereign equal-
ity. Although the Paris Peace Conference and Wilson’s project for the Covenant 
were envisioned as a new beginning for an ever more peaceful and civilized 
world, that world was still one where colonialism and discrimination were under-
stood as established aspects of modern life. The debates and decisions taken then 
brightly reflect that reality. It is therefore remarkable to see how fundamentally 
unequal States and peoples were only fifty years before the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, not only in practice but in the letter of law as well. 
 
                                               
 
38  Hunter Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol 1 p. 183–184. 
39  Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 81–86; MacMillan; Paris 1919,  p. 316, 318–319. 
40  Hunter Miller Vol I p. 184. 
41  Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 81–82. 
42  Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 85; MacMillan, Paris 1919 p. 320; Hunter Miller, The Draft-
ing of the Covenant vol I p. 461–464. Japan was later propitiated with the disputed Chinese province of 
Shandong, which in turn marked a travesty and public scandal for the Chinese. See Treaty of Versailles 
(1919) arts 156–158. On Wellington Koo’s concerns on the ‘Asiatic Monroe Doctrine’ see Hunter Miller 
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V. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
Unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization was established 
on the principle of sovereign equality. The principle emerged already in Allied 
wartime declarations which “recognize(d) the necessity of establishing, at the ear-
liest practicable date, a general international organization, based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States”.43 This principle was subse-
quently enshrined in Article 2(1). But just as well, the UN has also been character-
ized as representing “a deliberate retreat from the League’s comparative egalitari-
anism back to the great power conclaves of the past”.44 In the United Nations 
there are sovereigns and then there are Sovereigns. Insofar as sovereign equality 
of States was inserted into the Charter as the general and principal rule, then it 
meant that the exceptions and conditions to that main rule became increasingly 
visible and formal. From its very beginning, the UN was built on a division be-
tween the exclusive club of the Security Council with its veto-wielding permanent 
five, the General Assembly of all nations, the (now redundant) “enemy states”, 
and beyond them all still, the Non-Self-Governing Territories (i.e. colonies) and 
trusteeships. What, if anything, did sovereign equality in such a reality really 
come to mean? The battle for sovereign equality would very much preoccupy the 
organization for its first three decades. 
1. Charter drafting and Security Council 
During the preparations of the San Francisco conference, intense debates took 
place about the relations between the members of the future organization. In many 
ways the Dumbarton Oaks draft plan looked like a continuation of the League, 
with a strengthened position for the great powers over others. International experts 
decried particular rules and omissions, such as the optionality of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes or the lack of appeal from the Security Council to the General 
Assembly.45 Haiti proposed an amendment that echoed the old Japanese initiative 
                                               
 
43  Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, paragraph 4, in United Nations Documents 1941–1945 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1947) p. 13. There were similar brief references to the 
need of a security organization in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations and other 
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in 1919: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all States that love peace and exclude from their relations any racial or religious 
discrimination.”46 The most contentious issue was the privileged position of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. Smaller States raised concern over 
the compatibility of those privileges with the ideal of sovereign equality. Moreo-
ver, if they now signed the Charter these distinctions would be made permanent.47 
Some therefore proposed alterations to its role. Turkey, for one, submitted that the 
principle of sovereign equality should lead to the concentration of all matters of 
peace and security in the hands of the General Assembly, at least in the last in-
stance.48 But there was no way to secure the accession of the leading powers 
without granting them their special status.49 Ultimately, the resultant hierarchy 
was the price the signatories were willing to pay (albeit reluctantly) for a new se-
curity mechanism with a broad membership. But a hierarchy it was. In 1946, the 
Soviet jurist Eugene Korovin stated the situation candidly: 
It is nothing new in history for Great Powers to occupy a privileged position. What is new is that 
definite privileges are accorded the great democratic states not in their own interests but in the 
interests of all the states, of the whole international collectivity, by making their international 
rights correspond to their international obligations.50 
2. Trusteeships and Bretton Woods 
In the UN, the old mandates system was replaced by a new mechanism of trustee-
ships. The trusteeship system was quite consciously drafted to require little imme-
diate change from the colonial powers, and came as an acquiescence by the Unit-
ed States and other non-European powers to the continuance of European colonial 
                                                                                                                                
 
ble rules. “If, however, this hope is, indeed, too optimistic,” he warned, “if it shall be impossible to realize 
this minimum of centralization because it will be considered as incompatible with the ‘sovereign equality 
of all peace loving States,’ there will, then, be no hope at all for a real improvement of international rela-
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46  Proposed Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Haitian Delegation: Amend-
ment to Chapter II.  Documents of the UN Conference in San Francisco, 1945, Vol III p. 52. 
47  The government of the Netherlands voiced this quite openly: “The smaller powers, who are invited in the 
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48  Turkish opinion, Documents of the UN Conference in San Francisco, 1945, Vol III p. 481. 
49  Daniel-Erasmus Khan, ‘Drafting History’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas 
Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf eds, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume I (3rd 
edn., Oxford University Press 2012),  paras 41–51 at pp. 15–18. 
50  Eugene Korovin, ‘The Second World War and International Law’, 40 AJIL (1946) 742, 746. Also cited in 
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possessions (with a trade-off at Bretton Woods).51 Many of the attending States 
were content with the insertion of a grandiose and visionary preamble in the Char-
ter, and on the new principles of human rights, such as the goal of promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights “for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion” in Article 1(3). Arguably, this new human equality was 
emphasized instead of old sovereign equality. 
As formal colonialism itself proved unsustainable soon after the signing of the 
Charter, the trusteeship system gradually succeeded in making itself obsolete. But 
in 1945, this was not yet to be seen, and some trusteeships lingered on until the 
1990s as the concerned nations gradually either gained independence or voluntari-
ly joined existing States.52 By that time, however, independence did not necessari-
ly mean the attainment of full sovereign equality in the decolonizing world. Al-
ready a year before the Charter of the United Nations was brought to San Francis-
co, the other half of the bargain between the old colonial Europe and the new as-
cendant United States had played out at Bretton Woods – and in those discussions, 
the word “equals” was scarcely mentioned except in the domain of mathematical 
calculus. That conference was one of the starting-points for a new restructuring of 
the international community, where sovereign equality was substituted for old 
colonial subordinations, but at the same time new legal foundations were laid for 
safeguarding the continuing economic interests and privileges between developed 
and developing countries. 
During the world war, the major Allied powers had become acutely aware of 
their dependence on the natural resources and raw materials from across the seas. 
Moreover, among them the exigencies of war meant that the balance of power was 
shifting to the Western side of the Atlantic. When designing the economic future 
for the post-war period, it was increasingly obvious that as a price for their in-
volvement in the war, the Americans expected that the centuries of colonial mo-
nopolies would now come to an end.53 In the 1941 Atlantic Charter the U.S. and 
the U.K. agreed, as part of their common policies “for a better future for the world 
… to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of 
access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which 
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are needed for their economic prosperity”.54 In Article VII of the 1942 lend-lease 
agreement, Britain agreed to join the U.S. in like-minded action for the develop-
ment of world trade, including “the elimination of all forms of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers”.55 This was the project of the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, 
and the convenors of the event made no mistake about it.56  
When the new post-war economic institutions were set up, the goal of the full 
use of the resources of the world was also included in the first articles of the foun-
dational documents of the World Bank and the IMF.57 Unlike the UN Charter, the 
Articles of Agreement of the World Bank and the IMF did not mention sovereign 
equality. Instead, the voting power of each member State was dependent on its 
contributions and shares.58 The goal of “developing the full use of the resources of 
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods” was included 
then in the 1947 GATT.59 The early activities of bodies such as ECOSOC and 
FAO also included the surveying of natural resources and charting their distribu-
tion.60 In the post-war years the sentiment among the leading powers was that 
there was a scarcity of resources and that the economic reconstruction of the 
world (and the disaggregation of their wartime economies back to private entre-
preneurship) required unimpeded access to the raw materials wherever they were 
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found. In practice, this meant often operating abroad in the less developed coun-
tries of the world. 
3. The ‘Developing World’ 
The United Nations was no longer predominated by European empires. Europe 
was becoming increasingly provincialized, and its foremost global powers – the 
British and French empires – were breaking up internally. 61 The colonies had 
helped save their war-torn metropolitan centres, and now saw independence as 
their due. Ethnic and colonial disputes flared up throughout the colonial world, 
from South Africa to India to the Far East, and by the time India and Pakistan 
gained their independence, the members of the United Nations were well aware of 
the tide of history. In 1960, the General Assembly famously declared that “the 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes 
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Na-
tions and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation”, 
and that “immediate steps shall be taken” in colonized areas “to transfer all pow-
ers to the peoples of those territories”.62 To put an end to talks about a lack of 
civilization or the ability of nations to stand on their own feet, as had been the 
idioms in 1919, the Assembly underlined that “Inadequacy of political, economic, 
social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence”.63 The conditional form ‘should’ and the initial reluctance of Eu-
ropeans notwithstanding, the declaration did mark the way towards the transfor-
mation of colonies and trusteeships into independent States or voluntary overseas 
territories. 
The Decolonization Declaration heralded a transition from a distinction be-
tween empires and colonies into one of the developed and developing countries. 
The post-war vision of international free trade and circulation of raw materials did 
not seem perfectly acceptable to many of the newly independent States, many of 
which had had no say in their drafting. Accordingly, their representatives increas-
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ingly began to express a concern that these states were allocated a passive role in 
the extraction of their natural resources for the benefit of the “first world”. Ques-
tions arose about the extent of their self-determination and especially their rights 
to introduce their own autonomous economic policies that might differ from what 
the leading powers and the international economic institutions recommended. As 
the newly independent “third world” countries reached superior numbers, they 
joined together in the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77, hoping to lev-
erage the authority of the General Assembly, UNCTAD and other international 
fora to redesign the economic structures of the international system.64 
The primary impact of the movement was felt in the context of the exploita-
tion of raw materials enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and the GATT. Increasing 
need was felt for global access to natural resources in the developing world. As 
pointed out by Kurz, Viñuales and Waibel (Chapter 19), in the debates between 
1949 and 1951 it was anything but clear how to set the balance between the local 
and global interests. In the wake of the debacle that followed the nationalisation of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the argument over natural resources was reignit-
ed by a draft resolution by Uruguay, which recommended that member States rec-
ognise “the right of each country to nationalize and freely exploit its natural 
wealth, as an essential factor of economic independence”.65 The outcome was a 
compromise which omitted any direct reference to nationalization but recognized 
that “the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and re-
sources is inherent in their sovereignty” and which “recommended” the use of this 
right consistently with international economic co-operation among nations.66 Ac-
cordingly, Resolution 626 (VII) would be remembered in history as the “national-
ization resolution”.67 Similar  aspirations also blended with the ongoing drafting 
work of the international covenants of human rights. In 1958 the then-current 
draft of the Covenants included in the right of self-determination a “permanent 
sovereignty over ... natural wealth and resources”.68 The General Assembly con-
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stituted a specific commission to explore the permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources,69 which produced its report in 1961,70 and the following year the Decla-
ration on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources was adopted,71 in the 
spirit of the “mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality”.72 
 
And that is just about how far it went. In the final plenary debate before the vote, 
the Assembly had on the insistence of in particular the U.K. and the U.S. rejected 
a specific amendment proposed by the Soviet Union, which would have provided 
that the Assembly “unreservedly supports measures taken by peoples and States to 
re-establish or strengthen their sovereignty over natural wealth and resources, and 
considers inadmissible acts aimed at obstructing the creation, defence and 
strengthening of that sovereignty”.73 That wording was seen as leading into dise-
quilibrium between property rights and sovereign authority. In the end, while the 
declaration affirmed the sovereignty of states over their natural wealth, it also 
maintained that in cases of “nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning … the 
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in 
force in the State … and in accordance with international law”.74 It also included a 
general reference to the possibility of freely agreed arbitration as well as the spe-
cific notion that “foreign investment agreements … shall be observed in good 
faith”.75 As a result, the Declaration did not substantially venture into the terrain 
of the international law of State responsibility, which would still apply in situa-
tions of investment disputes. 
As pointed out by Kurz, Viñuales and Waibel (Chapter 16), this is not to say 
that the third world push in the Friendly Relations Declaration would have been 
utterly without effect. The oil exporting developing countries that joined in the 
OPEC cartel had by 1973 largely succeeded in gaining control of the vast majority 
of their fossil fuel reserves, had become important actors in the economic policy 
scene and, among other things, were able to establish an embargo against Western 
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countries collaborating with Israel at the time of the Yom Kippur war. Western 
petroleum conglomerates had been transformed from imperial actors into some-
thing like service providers. Significant gains were also attained in the law of the 
sea front. The establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the employment of the straight base-
lines method for the delimitation of the territorial waters of archipelagic states 
such as Philippines and Indonesia helped enclosing the resources in large mari-
time areas under the jurisdiction of developing coastal states. 76  The development 
of deep seabed resources in the interests of the developing states did not com-
mence as it was expected and the partial dilution of the provisions concerning the 
operation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) after the entry into force of 
the Convention may have been disappointing to the developing states.77 But the 
operations of the ISA, limited as they are, are among the few remaining institu-
tional results of the call for a New International Economic Order, launched for-
mally by the General Assembly in 1974.78 At the heart of that call was the contin-
uing insistence of a permanent right of states over their natural resources.  
 
While states continued to disagree on whether the permanent right of states over 
their natural resources entailed the duty to pay “full” or “appropriate” compensa-
tion for expropriations (the many arbitral awards remained indeterminate in that 
regard), the developed states began their counter-offensive by endorsing, in 1958, 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, in which they gave their blanket consent to the direct enforceability 
of awards of not only arbitrations appointed for each case but also those made by 
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties had submitted.79 In 1966 the ICSID 
convention brought to existence a dedicated investment arbitration framework 
under the auspices of the World Bank,80 and after blanket consent to investor-state 
arbitration was introduced in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) since 1969, the 
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structures undergirding the present-day practices of investor-state arbitration were 
in place and ready to be discovered by the claims industry in the 1990s.81 Since 
then, as Chapter 16 discusses at length, national sovereignty has often come under 
pressure owing to an arbitral practice that pays scarce regard to the principles un-
derlying the 1962 UN resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources.82 
 
VI. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY IN THE DRAFTING OF RESOLUTION 2625 
The Friendly Relations Declaration was officially intended to mark the 25th anni-
versary of the United Nations and to remind member States of the aspirations on 
which the organization was supposed to have been based. But in fact, it was un-
derstood by the majority of the members as an occasion to remind everyone of the 
distance between those aspirations and the reality of the international world. It 
became part of the push from the decolonized world to address the role of the or-
ganization in seeking a less unequal world. The attainment of formal independ-
ence and membership in the UN had not erased poverty and deprivation and the 
greatest part of member States remained still massively dependent on the former 
colonial powers. The alliance between the G77 and the socialist block remained 
firm and the shared intention was not only to restate the principles of the Charter 
but to give them an interpretation that would, as far as possible, highlight the ob-
jective of eradicating the colonial heritage and the global economic inequality that 
was part of it. The use of a Special Committee instead of the International Law 
Commission “gave weight”, according to Bedjaoui, “to the modern process for the 
elaboration of law by means of the resolution”.83  
“The principle of sovereign equality of States” was one of the seven princi-
ples that the UN General Assembly had requested the Special Committee set up in 
1964 to “study…so as to secure [its] more effective application”.84 Although the 
debate on this principle turned out, perhaps surprisingly, to be the least problemat-
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ic of the seven principles, the basic differences of approach were apparent from 
the outset. Three proposals lay on the table in 1964 – one from the socialist block 
(formally presented by Czechoslovakia), one from the developing countries (for-
mally by Ghana, India, Mexico and Yugoslavia) and Western proposal presented 
by the UK. Although the Special Committee was able to produce a consensus def-
inition on “sovereign equality” already at that first meeting, its report nevertheless 
was supplemented by a number of proposals that had fallen outside the consensus. 
There had been two principal points of contention. The first one had to do with the 
nature of the exercise. Was it intended merely to “clarify” or “highlight” the prin-
ciples of sovereign equality as laid out in Article 2(1) of the Charter, perhaps, as it 
was suggested, by restating the San Francisco definition of it? – Or was the inten-
tion also to “develop” it “in the light of the current needs of the world community, 
taking into account the progress achieved since 1945 in international law and in 
decolonization”? 85 The other principal point of contention had to do with the in-
clusion of economic aspects of equality in the declaration. This was often formu-
lated in terms of the familiar third world claim on permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, although in the course of the debate it was sometimes supple-
mented by the more widely expressed call for the right to “dispose freely of their 
national wealth and natural resources”.86 Reference was made in the debates to the 
UNCTAD as well as the General Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty 
of 1962 and 1966. On both issues, the developing countries failed to have their 
way. Some of their representatives expressed their disappointment at the final 
session in 1970 quite directly. In the end, the Committee had relied heavily on a 
draft produced at the San Francisco conference in 1945 – a draft to which refer-
ence was also made in Article 5 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States prepared by the ILC in 1949 (but never adopted by the General Assem-
bly).87  
The consensus definition reached in 1964, which eventually became also the 
final text, was this:  
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"l. All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members 
of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or 
other nature. 
2. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements: 
(a) States are juridically equal. 
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; 
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; 
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable; 
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural 
systems; 
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and 
to live in peace with other States."88 
The only substantive addition to the 1945 text was cold-war inspired sub-
paragraph (e) that underwrote the right of States to choose their “political, social, 
economic, and cultural systems”. It came from the drafts of socialist and develop-
ing States and, according to the sponsors, was intended to implement ideas em-
bedded in the 1955 Bandung and Belgrade Declarations.  
In the course of the debate six proposals were presented that did not com-
mand consensus and never made it to the text of the declaration. By far the most 
important of these was any formulation of the “permanent sovereignty of natural 
resources”. This would have enshrined a key objective of the New International 
Economic Order in the resolution – especially the principle that nationalization of 
foreign property would have been permitted in accordance with domestic law.89 
While the proposal of including something on substantive equality did receive – at 
least in an abstract way – some support from the Western representatives as well, 
in the end finding a set of words that would not simply legislate the NIEO into 
existence proved impossible. The painfulness of the debates was expressed in the 
cryptic summary of the last substantive debate on the matter that “Agreement in 
principle was reached on the desirability of including the concept of the right of 
every State freely to dispose of its national wealth and natural resources, but no 
agreement was reached on the text of such a provision”.90 
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As the Special Committee ended its work, many representatives noted that it 
had been reduced to “barest essentials” and that it “was not entirely satisfactory 
and needed to be completed”.91 But it turned out impossible to proceed further. 
So, what the committee did instead was to list the proposals that had not attained 
consensus and bring them to the notice of the General Assembly. In addition to 
the reference to freedom to use national wealth and domestic resources, these pro-
posals included equality in participation in international institutions and multilat-
eral treaties, prohibition of discrimination within the United Nations system, the 
right of each State to remove foreign military bases and the prohibition of “exper-
iments having harmful effects” on other countries.92 Perhaps a little enigmatically, 
also the suggestion that the sovereignty of the State was limited by international 
law failed to find its way into the principle. While a US delegate such as 
Rosenstock suspected that this represented an absolutist Soviet conception of sov-
ereignty, it was more likely that the (otherwise perhaps self-evident truism) did 
not get in because it was understood as a coded endorsement of the Western posi-
tion that compensation for nationalized property had to be paid under the “prompt, 
adequate and effective” rule (the notorious “Hull formula”).93  
The declaration was accepted unanimously at the 25th anniversary session of 
the United Nations. The speeches at the General Assembly were, generally speak-
ing, celebratory, although some also lamented the lack of ambition in their formu-
lation. The representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the 41 OAU member 
States, highlighted the importance of the UN for the newly decolonized countries 
and used the occasion to remind the members of the struggle against colonialism 
and apartheid. He was broadly supported by the representative Poland on behalf 
of the socialist countries – the latter not failing to highlight peaceful coexistence 
“of states with different political and social systems”.   
VII. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY SINCE 1970 
Gradually, the Friendly Relations Declaration became a standard reference point 
for subsequent multilateral UN instruments having to do with international law. 
Yet, one may suspect that not many will remember, for example, the 1982 Manila 
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Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1987 Declaration on the En-
hancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or 
Use of Force in International Relations or the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention 
and Removal Disputes and Situations which May Threaten International Peace 
and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field.94 The fact is that 
reiterations of UN principles by subsequent declarations has rarely translated into 
tangible action.  
But the Friendly Relations Declaration also received life within the “Helsinki 
process” and served as the example for the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act in 
1975. Article I of that act was precisely on “Sovereign equality, respect for the 
rights inherent in sovereignty”, and while the first paragraph repeated the familiar 
wordings on “juridical equality”, “territorial integrity and political independence” 
as well as respect for political, economic and cultural systems, they also added 
another paragraph with partly new content:  
“Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and du-
ties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other 
States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They con-
sider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means 
and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organiza-
tions, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to 
be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality”.95 
Here now was some material that did not get into the UN Declaration, such as 
confirming their equal right to become members of international institutions and 
multilateral treaties – a provision underwriting their different security alliances 
(NATO and the Warsaw Pact) as well as the right to stay out of them. Attention is 
drawn to the intangibility of boundaries – a key aspect of the Helsinki process and 
a major achievement especially for the socialist bloc. Why this would be included 
under “sovereign equality” is hard to say, apart from as an explication of the point 
about territorial integrity  
One might want to know more generally about the fate of the principle of 
sovereign equality in the international law field. Third World lawyers never fail to 
reference sovereign equality in their works or speeches. It is highlighted in vari-
ous instruments dealing with international development, including for example the 
Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Sub-
soil thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction, adopted also in 1970, that 
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enshrined the principle that the areas outside domestic jurisdiction constituted a 
“common heritage of mankind” and eventually led to the III UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea and the 1982 Montego Bay Convention.97 In the 1984 UN Re-
port on the progressive development of international law relating to the New In-
ternational Economic Order, sovereign equality still stood elevated as a chief 
principle,98 but after the demise of the NIEO in the late 1980s and 1990s its ap-
pearance has diminished together with the other Third World themes associated 
with it. 
 Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
fails to expressly mention sovereign equality, instead including a slightly revised 
version of the famous “Principle 21” of the Stockholm declaration (1972), accord-
ing to which all States have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the respon-
sibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of nation-
al jurisdiction”, itself preceded by a reference to “in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter and the principles of international law”.  The practical implemen-
tation of that provision has involved some recognition by the developed world that 
the duties of States may vary (e.g. the reference to ‘developmental policies’ in 
Principle 2 and, more generally, Principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration) and 
that developed States may have an obligation to assist the less developed ones 
technologically and financially on meeting the objectives laid out in such later 
environmental and sustainable development instruments as the UNFCCC or the 
subsequent Paris Agreement. 
One of the key problems with respect to “sovereign equality” has been that of 
positive discrimination. In a number of situations treaty partners have moved be-
yond a purely formal treatment of everyone “similarly” so as to recognize histori-
cal differences in de facto capacity in determining the rights and duties of states, 
such as in the provisions on preferential treatment within the GATT/WTO regime. 
Whether this recognition would have crystallized into anything like a customary 
rule may be usefully approached from the perspective of the widely applicable 
anti-formal principles about equity, reasonableness, proportionality and the like 
into multilateral treaties – the principle of “equitable utilization” in the convention 
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on international watercourses possibly serving as one example.99 Much criminal 
or otherwise harmful activity in the natural environment or in cyberspace takes 
place by private actors, and there may be some agreement that the duty of control 
(whether “overall” or “effective”) and of due diligence that applies to them varies 
in relation to the capacities of the State in question. But the statement of the Inter-
national Court of Justice from the early 1980s still remains that economic consid-
erations cannot affect party obligations  
“…since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or calamity, as the case may be, 
might at any time cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. A country might be poor today and 
become rich tomorrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable economic re-
source”.100 
A similar point has been made by the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of Sea in connection with States sponsoring activities in the sea-
bed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction, the so-called Area.101 
In the years since the passing of the Friendly Relations Declaration, Western 
academic lawyers have often been sympathetic towards the claims of the G77 but 
suspicious of reading the sovereign equality principle as legally binding on its 
own right. Generally speaking, in their view, international law and the UN Charter 
had nothing to do with the past injustices, and the best way for the developing 
world to catch up was to join the system and seek to influence its content from the 
inside. In the 1979 edition of his widely read How Nations Behave Louis Henkin 
noted that new States had not posed any great challenge to international law but 
had joined without great protest because “[a]cceptance into that society as an in-
dependent equal was the proof and crown of their successful struggle, and interna-
tional law provided the indispensable framework for living in that society”.102  For 
Henkin and for the majority of Western lawyers, to be addressed as sovereign 
equals cancelled whatever problems about colonialism and the rhetoric of “civili-
zation” had existed earlier. No great structural impediments for attaining substan-
tive equality existed any longer. Now it was simply the task of the Third World to 
use the UN and other international institutions to attain their policy objectives.  
It is very uncertain whether that is still a correct assessment of the situation – 
and it probably never was. The most obvious and unobjectionable aspects of sov-
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ereign equality relate usually to its “technical” uses in formalities or questions of 
protocol. Here there is less of a problem – Vattel’s view of small and large States 
standing on the same line still applies – with the most significant exceptions hav-
ing to do with the position of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council and weighted voting in especially international financial institutions 
where formal influence in decision-making is measured by reference to a coun-
try’s contribution. But there is no reasonable effort to undermine the first of the 
elements of the 1970 definition, the “juridical equality” between States, the equal-
ity of their standing in front of international law-applying bodies. Of course, even 
this matter is influenced by developments in the “real” or political world, and one 
may enquire into the way in which the uneven jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court might be invoked as a counter-example. The effort of the United 
States to exempt its military personnel and its later action against the court and its 
officials are part of the imperialist turn of its recent government that is happy to 
lead the country outside a world where protocols and formality are taken serious-
ly.103  
VIII. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 
Equality is not a measurable thing like mass or temperature that can be described 
using precise units derived from universal constants of nature.104 To be “equal” 
refers to a relative system or standard – it refers to the question “equal in what 
respect”?  It involves a comparison and needs an external point of view, a stand-
ard and a comparator or at least a shared understanding from which two entities 
may or may not appear as sufficiently similar to be treated in the same way. Poor 
communities can be equal in respect to each other but unequal in respect to rich 
ones. Neither equality not sovereign equality exclude different treatment as such. 
On the contrary, equality does not only mean treating those that are similar in 
some respect in a similar way, but also treating differently those whose situation is 
de facto different – again, different in a relevant respect. While this principle is 
frequently accepted in domestic societies – people with different income levels 
pay different amounts of tax and people with disabilities are provided assistance 
not available to those who have no such disabilities – it has been much more diffi-
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cult to accept anything of the kind on the international plane. Mechanisms of 
“positive discrimination” of the kind involved in preferential treatment in interna-
tional trade law or in contributions to international environmental regimes are 
weak and often contested. We may easily understand why this would be the case. 
In the domestic context, there is some rudimentary solidarity that allows citizens 
to recognize that their shared “citizenship” entitles them to view each other from 
the perspective of some imagined idea of what binds them together – a shared 
religion, history, common ideas of nationhood and the like. These ideas constitute 
the “third” – the basic criteria or values – that enable treating otherwise different 
individuals similarly (as “citizens”) but also taking account of relevant differences 
as bases for different treatment (e.g. by taxing richer citizens with a higher per-
centage or by creating quota to ensure the representation of formerly under-
represented groups of citizens).  
In the international world, there is no such “third” – no shared criteria, under-
standings or values – that could justify deviation from the utterly formal standard 
of “sovereign statehood”.105 Of course, states could in principle try to agree on 
some relative classifications through mutual agreement or by relying on quantita-
tive criteria and indexes. But all this would come uncomfortably close to seeking 
a “standard of civilization” anew and would be very hard to administer. In prac-
tice, it has been seen that it is hard to object against a state’s self-qualification as a 
member of a special class of states in case benefits might accrue to such member-
ship.  In any case, such instances would be bound to remain rare and of marginal 
importance.  
Thus we are left with an indeterminate vision of equality, a seemingly com-
mon standard which still harks back to Vattel’s intuitive utopia: whether large or 
small, rich or poor, old or new, all States must be similarly treated. That is an easy 
standard to apply. It operates automatically and presupposes no evaluation on an-
ybody’s part. “If you are a state, then this is how you will be treated”. That is of 
great value in a society where there is a priori no solidarity and no trust that law-
appliers would use their discretion in an acceptable way. So they are granted 
none. But like any bright-line rule, this, too, is both over and under-inclusive. It is 
over-inclusive to the extent that it applies the same treatment also to those who in 
actual fact would deserve being treated differently. And it fails to apply that 
treatment to those “non-States” who in a relevant respect would deserve to be 
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treated just like States because there is no relevant difference between them and 
“formal States” (Palestine, Western Sahara, Tibet…).  
It is true of course, that people constantly complain about the injustice of 
formal equality – we have seen the repeated claim by the global south that histori-
cal injustices against them ought to be taken into account in assessing the contri-
butions that those States would have to pay for participating in international coop-
eration on environmental protection, for example. The call for preferential treat-
ment appeals to one type of solidarity across the world. But that is by no means 
the only basis on which deviation from formal equality is proposed. Others cri-
tique that: 
“[t]he smallest and financially weakest states, representing a minority of the total population in the 
organization, possess a majority of the votes. Paying a fractional share of the assessments of the 
organization, they are able to outvote those paying the highest rates”.106  
An occasional Western complaint in the past against majorities in the UN General 
Assembly, this claim is bound to be resuscitated with the neo-right nationalism en 
vogue in the United States and parts of Europe. It, too, builds on a “third” that 
enables treating different entities differently – only this time not building on soli-
darity but on white supremacism.  
By and large, the Friendly Relations Declaration may well be understood as a 
vocal renunciation of any further formal structures de jure of distinction between 
sovereigns. Understood as such, it is a vow of humanity to never return to the 
rhetoric of Lorimer and his contemporaries. And with many observers, in particu-
lar those in affluent and influential countries of the past decades, this may well 
have been enough. But the question of ever-increasing inequality in the factual 
world, combined with the seemingly perpetual distinction between the “devel-
oped” world and the “developing” world, cannot but lead one to ask whether in-
deed a degree of factual equality is a prerequisite for true formal intercourse be-
tween equals. The boundary here is hard to determine, for in a world of formal 
equals but factual un-equals, most structural inequalities can be rephrased as mat-
ters of chance and circumstance, and vice versa. The wealthier States may always 
argue that their status as nuclear powers or their precedence in deep-sea mining or 
the conquest of the Antarctic is due to their hard-earned success, not structural 
inequality; but just as well, a brutal dictatorship may declare that its people are 
happy and more determined to live in surveillance, discipline and punishment, 
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having no desire for standardized guarantees of basic human dignity. On the other 
hand, the same brutal dictator might at some other occasion explain that the hell-
ish conditions of his or her citizens are forced by the unfair balances with which 
the game of global economy and imperialism are rigged. But speaking of structur-
al inequality, a powerful State may for its own part clinch to veto any form of 
world-improvement, arguing that it is itself a victim of structural bias which 
threatens to undermine the fairness of the mutually agreed global institutions, 
therefore demanding that the advanced powers resign from multilateralism alto-
gether …   
Again: the great problem with “sovereign equality” is that it cannot be ap-
plied without some criterion of justice that points to the relevant quality in ac-
cordance which entities such as “States” may appear either “similar” or “differ-
ent”. The attainment of statehood is expected to endow every entity filling the 
requisite criteria with all the rights and privileges, as well as all the obligations, of 
statehood. It was this type of justice that was highlighted during decolonization. 
But equality also requires that entities that are different are not forced in the same 
straight-jacket, that it would be wrong to impose obligations on those who, for 
whatever reason, are unable to bear them. Rules about “reverse discrimination”, 
special rights and preferential treatment are a commonplace in domestic legal sys-
tems, even if their application is always more or less contested. Such contestations 
reflect differing ideas about the type of justice that the domestic polity should 
stand for. But there usually is no disagreement that it should stand for some jus-
tice. By contrast, on the international plane, it is much harder to say not only what 
type of justice the international system should seek to advance, but whether it 
should advance any ideas of justice at all. The Cold War view of international law 
as a pure coordination between systems sharing no concept of justice at all has 
been thoroughly discredited. For a moment, in the 1990s, it may even have ap-
peared that a broadly liberal, free trade and human-rights oriented justice was be-
ing institutionalized in international institutions. In the present world of nationalist 
conflict and Realpolitik, it would be much more daring to suggest that interna-
tional law stands for some idea about a just world – beyond repeating the hypo-
critical mantra about “friendly relations among nations”. It would be tragedy if,  
looking back fifty years from 2020, we found that we have made no progress from 
where we were then.  
